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ABSTRACT
This article reviews the Council of Canadian Academies Expert Panel report on business
innovation. It finds the report comprehensive in its gathering and assessment of available
research, innovative, in its own right, in its analysis of innovation as an outcome of
business strategy formation, and impressively well ordered and written. Both lay readers and
professional students of innovation and labour productivity will find the report to be of great
value.
IN 2007, THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
requested the Council of Canadian Academies
(CCA) to canvas the innovation performance of
Canadian business, and in particular to shed
light on Canada’s relatively weak investment
among OECD countries in innovation inputs
(and the consequent inferior growth in the rate
of labour productivity, particularly over the last
two decades). The CCA established an Expert
Panel to address this request. The resulting
report Innovation and Business Strategy: Why
Canada Falls Short, presents a comprehensive
survey of the research literature and a skilful
and balanced interpretation of that literature
that will instruct both professional and lay
audiences. Further, in seeking to advance
understanding of Canada’s poor performance,
the Panel itself innovates in analyzing the pos-
sible explanations by examining the factors that
can be thought of as influencing innovation as a
business strategy. All of this is presented in
eleven chapters of inexorable logical flow, the
interpretations of the evidence balanced and
appropriately qualified, and with a felicity of
presentation that is continuously striking.
Though issues of measurement and interpreta-
tion in matters of innovation and productivity
are inherently complex, one would not hesitate
to recommend the Panel’s report to any intelli-
gent reader seeking to gain command of issues
that are of considerable moment in the fortunes
of Canada and Canadians.
Peter Nicholson, in the introductory article of
this symposium, has summarized the report.
The coherence with which the story is told and
the care with which it is presented is a central
strength of the report. The body of evidence
which the Panel surveys and cites to measure the
innovative performance of the Canadian busi-
ness sector and through that performance the
alarmingly disappointing growth in labour pro-
ductivity serves to concentrate the mind, per-
haps even those minds aware of many of the
elements of the story. After making clear the
1 The author is Chair of the Board of Directors of the Centre for the Study of Living Standards. He served in a
number of senior positions in the federal government, including Deputy Minister of Energy, Mines and
Resources and Deputy Minister of Finance. Email: stewart007@rogers.com.86 NUMBER 18, SPRING 2009 
conceptual links between innovation, productiv-
ity growth, per capita output, incomes and well-
being, the empirical evidence which the Panel
gathered has a considerable cumulative weight.
The long-run difference in output per capita of
roughly 20 per cent relative to the United
States, almost entirely due to differing levels of
labour productivity, appeared to be sharply nar-
rowing into the mid-1980s as a broad-based
convergence of OECD countries with the U.S.
seemed to be in train. After peaking at 93 per
cent of the U.S. level in 1984, annual labour pro-
ductivity growth in Canada departed the train,
leading to a steady descent to a level less than 80
per cent in 2007, a level not seen since the late
1960s. Further Canada’s average labour produc-
tivity growth over the same period ranked 15th
out of 18 OECD countries. Of this lagging per-
formance around 90 per cent is attributed to the
poor performance of multi-factor productivity
in the business sector, the residual in the decom-
position of labour productivity growth after
increasing capital intensity and improvements in
the quality of the labour force have been
accounted for. Part of the explanation involves
the slower investment in information and com-
munication technologies (ICT) by Canadian
businesses.
In pursuit of a more comprehensive explana-
tion the Panel devotes a chapter to a thorough
examination of the innovation performance of
Canadian business. The report presents a rich
and sophisticated canvas of what is known about
the inputs, outputs and outcomes of business
innovation activity. Among the elements exam-
ined, machinery and equipment investment, the
quality of labour inputs, and an array of output
and outcome measures, it is the almost astonish-
ing under-performance of the business sector
with respect to research and development
expenditure that is at the heart of the story. 
Most industries in Canada perform little or no
R&D. Business sector R&D expenditures as a
percent of GDP (BERD) hobble along at
roughly half the US level and rank in the bottom
half of relevant OECD countries. When it is
estimated that a sustained one-tenth of one per-
centage point increase in BERD would lead to
an increase of 1.2 per cent in GDP per capita,
and when it is understood that Canadian BERD
levels of approximately 1.0 per cent compare
with the US level of 2.0 per cent, it is impossible
to escape an explanation of Canadian BERD as a
central issue. Further the fact that R&D expen-
ditures are generally thought to carry with them
consequential positive externalities underlies
two central understandings of why private sector
R&D may be underdone and why there is a sub-
stantial rationale for public policy involvement.
To the public policy issues this review will
return.
The report then seeks to broaden examination
of the possible factors affecting business sector
innovation performance by focussing discussion
on innovation as business strategy. The Panel,
with justification, sees the attempt to direct the
discussion in this way as a substantially innova-
tive contribution to the understanding of the
behaviour of Canadian firms. Under five head-
ings — structural characteristics, competitive
intensity, climate for new ventures, public poli-
cies, and business ambition — the report
addresses successive chapters to broadening
understanding of the factors influencing firm
behaviour. While the discussions under each
head are again thorough and provide persuasive
elements of understanding, one is left with the
sense that the diagnosis is unsettlingly insuffi-
cient.
Though the Panel takes care to describe the
total body of its work as ‘a diagnosis’ rather than
a policy prescription, it recognizes that the body
of facts and informed opinion that it offers are of
‘policy relevance’. In fact, unless one’s profes-
sional preoccupation is directed exclusively at
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report without continuously reflecting on its
policy implications. And, indeed, it is difficult
not to feel that the Panel embeds its analysis in
approved Canadian policy postures of the last
two decades and is itself a little baffled that the
private sector’s performance has been so disap-
pointing. Controlled inflation, deregulation of
product and labour markets, very sharp reduc-
tions in the program expenditures of the federal
government and with that reduction a dramatic
decline in the overhang of public debt, a scien-
tific research tax credit as rich as any among
OECD countries, all the fundamental prescrip-
tions of three decades of neoliberal economics
do not appear to have yielded any very measur-
able payoff. 
To be perhaps a little unkind, though the
report approves the potential complementarities
between government and academic research, it
generally seems to approve of low tax regimes
(recognizing that all taxes are disincentives)
without any very full discussion of the ‘civiliza-
tion’ that taxes buy, affecting the context in
which business ventures proceed. Further the
existence of complementarities carries with it
the notion of public and academic R&D sup-
porting private sector innovation. Though well
outside the Panel’s mandate to explore, it may
be that progressively impinging social limits to
private growth may require an increasing share
of Canadian R&D to be shouldered by the pub-
lic sector as public rather than private goods
come to dominate future enhancement of the
well-being of Canadians.
However that may be, the Panel does recog-
nize that its presumption of globalization pro-
ceeding apace where the well-being of
Canadians is critically dependent on the com-
petitive aspects of private-sector productivity
growth may have to be conditioned by the dra-
matic collapse of growth currently in progress.
There seems little doubt that this collapse, how-
ever and whenever growth is resumed, will lead
to a substantial reaction to the policy structures
of the past 30 years and the probable acceptance
of a much expanded role for government. This
probability is further enhanced by the steadily
increasing evidence that climate change will
compel governments to confront much more
radical policy responses than so far contem-
plated. One does not have to believe the well
known UK scientist James Lovelock
(www.jameslovelock.org), that the collapse of
world population to the neighbourhood of one
billion by 2100 is already foregone to believe
that the ascending evidence, as in the Stern
Report, commends much more dramatic action.
Once again the Panel makes reference to the rel-
evance of climate change issues without embed-
ding their imperatives in the analysis.
Both because these developments could be
said to have overtaken the Panel’s report and
because the Panel clearly eschewed a direct con-
cern with the report’s policy implications, it is
not to be critical of the report to suggest that
these two issues —recession/depression and cli-
mate change — may be said to offer the oppor-
tunity to confront some of the issues which the
report cites as inhibiting private sector innova-
tion. One begins with the Finnish model, the
rapid transformation of a resource-driven econ-
omy to one dedicated to R&D and innovation,
which the report cites. It further suggests that
the government/public sector/private sector
understandings and commitment needed to
implement such a rapid transformation is only
possible with a much more homogeneous popu-
lation and culture than Canada offers.
The notion that the lack of the possibility of a
cohesive public understanding precludes public/
private sector collaboration in Canada has been
often asserted, particularly with respect to the
possibility of industrial policy or more elaborate
welfare structures. In part, of course, this may be
thought of as reflecting the influence of a com-
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reflects an industrial structure which, as the
panel notes, places much Canadian private sec-
tor activity ‘high up the value chain’, either as
subsidiaries of foreign parents, or in the extrac-
tive industries, content with up-stream profits
and disinclined to invest in complementary and
down-stream activities. Given sufficient
urgency however, it can be argued that there is
little evidence of an incapacity in Canada to
mount concerted action. It can be further
argued that the growing urgency of an elaborate
response to global warming will demand not
only the pricing of carbon (by whatever scheme)
but invention and innovation across the broad
waterfront of alternate energy systems, less
damaging extractive industries (e.g. carbon cap-
ture) and revolutions in transportation. Indeed
it may be that Canada’s continued reliance on
resource exports to offset its disappointing pro-
ductivity record will depend on finding urgent
solutions to the global warming impacts of their
production. Beyond particular fixes, one might
think of Canada as having some sort of compar-
ative advantage in leading such revolutions,
turning necessity to opportunity, and beginning
the long trek to serious sustainability designs.
Such concerted action, both through struc-
tures of public policy and more explicit col-
laboration, may be made more conceivable by
the need to find investment expenditures that
can provide the underpinnings for the climb
from the deepest economic trough since the
1930s. The ‘new and better ways to do valued
things’ (the Panel’s definition of innovation
and the sources of the next ‘bubble’) may
demand more explicit collective resolve than
reliance exclusively on private markets. The
world has been launched on a soul-searching,
not just around the reformation and regula-
tion of financial systems and institutions, but
also to revisit the dominant faith in private
markets in shaping public policy over the past
30 years. It may even be that ‘share-holder
value’ will cease to be the sole criterion by
which enterprises are judged and a rising
importance of longer-term considerations and
social purpose may elevate the role of ‘innova-
tion as a business strategy’.